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RECENT CASES
ing itself to all kinds of school segregation, especially in its statement on the
extent of judicial review of a board's action.
50 This reading of Brown is
disputed by some commentators and was not used by the Court of Appeals.
51
Judge Desmond's opinion limited comment on Brown to a statement that it
proscribes state imposed segregation. However, there is an implication that the
principle regarding the educational value of an integrated education-which was
recognized by the Supreme Court-was also considered in Balaban. In reaching
its determination, the Court of Appeals weighed the effects of the disputed
action. The Board's consideration of race as one factor in determining the
school district's boundaries did not, demonstrably, disadvantage the white chil-
dren. But it did promote, in a positive sense, the objective of equal, integrated
education for all children.52 It is suggested that the Court of Appeals implicitly
indicated the limits on future corrective action by a board and the possible
means of challeging such action. Boards cannot cause oppression, and anyone
challenging a plan must show the plan to be arbitrary and oppressive.
8 Con-
tinued use of this analysis would permit corrective action by a board and still
allow sufficient judicial supervision. Considering the recent denial of certiorari




THE EFFECT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAuDs ON AN IMPLIED CONTRACT
In November 1957, plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agree-
ment by which plaintiff was to act as exclusive export manager for products
used with photographic and sound recording equipment manufactured by the
defendant. The contract was to run for one year: from January 1, 1958 until
December 31, 1958. For his services plaintiff was allowed a discount on prices
bf the items to be handled. Both parties performed under the contract that
year. Without any further express agreement the parties also carried on this
arrangement from January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959 and during the early
part of 1960. In April 1960, the defendant refused to accept plaintiff's services
any longer. Plaintiff brought an action in the New York Supreme Court, for
go. On reargument of Brown, the Supreme Court said, "School authorities have the
primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving [local] problems; courts will
have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementa-
tion of the ... principles." 349 U.S. 296, 299 (1955). The Appellate Division also emphasized
that boards of education were to use rezoning as one technique in effectuating the equal
educational opportunity principle. Brown v. Board of Education, supra at 300-01.
91. Compare Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General
Northern Problem, supra note 49 with Maslow, De Facto Public School Segregation, 6
Vill. L. Rev. 353 (1961).
52. Brief for N.A.A.C.P. as Amicus Curiae, p. 12.
53. See Comment, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 539, 545-48 (1964).
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breach of contract. The contract alleged was the second renewal agreement
beginning January 1, 1960. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings
on the grounds that the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to state a cause
of action, and on further grounds that since the original contract was oral and
for more than a year the Statute of Frauds constituted a complete defense to the
action. This motion was denied. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered
judgment for the defendant for the reason that the original express contract
was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds because it could not be completed
within a year from its making and therefore, no new contract could be implied
therefrom. The Court of Appeals held that if a renewed contract could be proven
by the surrounding facts, the Statute of Frauds would not be a bar. For this rea-
son, it reversed and remanded the case to the Special Term for a determination of
facts. Cinefot International Corp. v. Hudson Photographic Industries, 13 N.Y.2d
249, 196 N.E.2d 54, 246 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1963).
In New York an oral contract not to be performed within a year from its
making is within the Statute of Frauds.' Once the contract has been performed
the Statute of Frauds does not apply.2 Where the term of service under a
contract, taken out of the statute because of full performance, is for more than
one year the law can not imply a new contract for a similar period. In that
case the renewal itself would be within the statute.8 However, where the term
of service under the original contract is for one year or less a renewal agreement
for a similar period may be implied.4 The relevant time period for determining
the effect which the Statute of Frauds has upon the renewal agreement begins on
the date service is to start and not on the date the agreement was entered into.
It ceases when the term of service ends. In 1891 the Court of Appeals of New
York applied these basic principles of contract law in the case of Adams V.
Fitzpatrick.5 It was there settled as New York law that where one orally enters
the employment of another for one year, there may arise an inference of fact
that the parties intended to renew for another year. This inference was available
to the party claiming the renewal even though the original contract was made
more than a year before its original expiration date and thus, until performed,
would itself have been unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
When the term of service under the original contract is for more than one
1. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 31 (now Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701 (1964)); Belfert v.
Peoples Planning Corp. of America, 11 A.D.2d 760, 202 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1st Dep't 1960),
appeal dismissed, 8 N.Y.2d 1054, 170 N.E.2d 403, 207 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1960).
2. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 85 (now U.C.C. § 2-201 (1964)); Tyler v. Windels, 227
N.Y. 589, 125 N.E. 926, affirming, 186 App. Div. 698, 174 N.Y. Supp. 762 (1st Dep't 1919) ;
Schenley Distillers Corp. v. R. C. Williams & Co., Inc., 64 N.Y.S.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
Cf. Brown v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 117 N.Y. 266, 22 N.E. 952 (1889).
3. Schott v. La Compagnie Generale Trans-Atlantique, 52 Misc. 236, 102 N.Y. Supp.
901 (Sup. Ct. 1906).
4. Cf. Goldman v. N.Y. Advertising Co., 29 Misc. 133, 60 N.Y. Supp. 275 (Sup. Ct.
1899) ; Lonsdale v. J. A. Migel Inc., 222 App. Div. 197, 225 N.Y. Supp. 593 (2d Dep't 1927).
5. Adams v. Fitzpatrick 125 N.Y. 124, 26 N.E. 143 (1891); accord, Brightson v. H. B.
Claflin Co., 180 N.Y. 76, 72 N.E. 920 (1904).
6. Adams v. Fitzpatrick, supra note 5, at 127, 26 N.E. at 144.
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year and a hold-over occurs, the Adams Court pointed out that the renewal
agreement could escape the ban of the Statute of Frauds only in two areas
where the term of service of the renewal agreement is implied as a matter of law
to be for one year, provided of course that no contrary intent is shown from the
surrounding facts.7 First, when a tenant holds over after the expiration of a
lease the law will imply a renewed contract for one year, but such a tacit re-
newal of leases applied only to real property. Thus if a chattel, not real property,
is leased and a holdover occurs, the court will not imply from the holdover
alone, a renewal for one year as a matter of law.8 This rule of automatic renewal
in property law has its counterpart in the field of master-servant relationships.
Where one serves another under a contract and continues in his employment
after the expiration of the term, there may be a new contract implied by law
for one year, provided that a contrary intent is not evidenced by the facts.0
In the instant case, the Appellate Division reasoned that a renewed agree-
ment could not be implied from the surrounding facts after a holdover occurred,
because such a renewed agreement would be for the same time period as the
original contract and therefore itself within the Statute. The court distinguished
the A dams holding on the grounds that it was predicted on a master-servant
relationship, in contrast to the agency relationship which was present in the
instant case. The Appellate Division believed that if a renewal can be implied
from the facts, the agreement can escape from the requirements of the Statute
of Frauds only if, by implication of law, the term of service is one year. Such
an implication is permissible in a master-servant relationship but not in an
agency relationship. The court, therefore, viewed the Adams case as "strictly
confined to agreements in which the master and servant relationship is the
base of the contract."' 0 The Court of Appeals, however, analyzed the case as
involving two distinct problems. First, what is the effect of the Statute of Frauds
on a renewed agreement if the original contract was within the Statute? Second,
once the Statute of Frauds problem is removed, under what circumstances will
an implied renewal from the surrounding facts be allowed? Does the relation-
ship between the parties have any bearing on this second problem? In answer to
the first question, it is obvious from the language of the court, although not
expressly stated,othat the Statute of Frauds will not bar a renewed agreement
if such a renewal can be shown." The original contract was entered into in
November 1957 and the term of service was not to be completed until December
1959 and, therefore, until completed the contract was within the Statute. How-
ever, the relevant time period with reference to the renewed agreement would
7. Id. at 128, 26 N.E. at 145.
8. Chamberlain v. Pratt, 33 N.Y. 47 (1865).
9. Mason v. Lory Dress Co., Inc., 104 N.Y.S.2d 906 (Sup. Ct. 1951), modified, 279
App. Div. 863, 110 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 600, 111 N.E.2d 649
(1953).
10. Cinefot International Corp. v. Hudson Photographic Indus., Inc., 18 A.D.2d 5, 6,
237 N.Y.S.2d 742, 744 (1st Dep't 1963).
11. Instant case at 250, 196 N.E.2d at 56, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 397 (1963).
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be the actual term of service-one year-from January 1, 1958 to December 31,
1958. Therefore it would be possible for the plaintiff to show a renewal for a
similar one year period and thereby avoid the Statute of Frauds ban. In
answer to the second problem, the court was aware of the agency relationship but
it concluded that a plaintiff should be permitted to show an agreed renewal from
the fact of continuance beyond a year. The relationship between the parties
was deemed to be irrelevant where the contract was for the performance of
services. The question as to a renewed agreement is one of fact and as such the
plaintiff must sustain his burden of proof.'2
The position taken by the Appellate Division is difficult to sustain when
viewed in the light of existing case law both in New York state and elsewhere. 18
The difficulty encountered appears to be based upon too narrow an interpretation
of the 1891 case. 14 The intermediate court imposed a limitation in the ap-
plication of its holding which does not seem to be justified either by the language
of that case or by subsequent decisions.'; The Court of Appeals is not making
new law or even extending pre-existing law. It is merely clarifying and re-ap-
plying basic principles of contract law which have a firm footing in New York
case law. This is being done in an area of the law which obviously and under-
standably involved some confusion.
DAVID BROWN
CRIMINAL LAW
POST-DATED CHECK MAY BE CRIMINAL OFFENSE UNDER § 1292-a or N.Y.
PENAL CODE
Defendant mailed a check on October 19, 1959, which was dated October
22, 1959.1 The check was received by the complainant on October 22, 1959,
and he deposited the check. A few days later the bank notified the com-
plainant that the check was returned because of insufficient funds on part
of the defendant,2 and subsequently the defendant was convicted of issuing
a fraudulent check.8 He appealed, claiming that the instrument was a post-
dated check, and that a conviction under section 1292-a of, the Penal Law4
12. Id. at 253, 196 N.E.2d at 56, 246 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
13. Sines v. Wayne Co., 58 Mich. 503, 25 N.W. 486 (1885).
14. Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 26 N.E. 143 (1891).
15. Cf. Chase v. Second Ave. R.R., 97 N.Y. 384 (1884).
1. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, p. 6.
2. Brief for Respondent, p. 2.
3. People v. Aryeh, 18 A.D.2d 967 (1st Dep't 1963), affirming by memorandum deci-
sion a judgment of the former Court of Special Sessions, New York City.
4. The relevant language.of section 1292-a of the N.Y. Penal Law reads as follows:
"Any person who, with intent to defraud, shall make or draw or utter or deliver any
check, draft, or order for payment of money . . . upon any bank or other depository,
knowing at the time of such making, . . . that the maker or drawer has not sufficient
funds in or credit with such bank or other depository for the payment of such check,
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